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COMPENSATORY DAMAGES IN FEDERAL 
FAIR HOUSING CASES 
Robert G. Schwemm* 
Introduction 
The federal fair housing laws became effective in 1968. I Since 
then, courts have often awarded damages to victims of housing dis-
crimination, but their decisions have provided little guidance for 
assessing the amount of such awards. There is a great range of awards, 
with some courts awarding only nominal damages of $1 and others 
setting awards of over $20,000.2 Compounding the problem is the dif-
ficulty of measuring the principal element of damages claimed by most 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. 
I The Fair Housing Act (Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968), 42 U .S.C. §§ 
3601-3619 (1976), was enacted in 1968, the same year that the Supreme Court held 
that the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (1976), banned private as 
well as public housing discrimination. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 
(1968). 
2 Among the cases that have awarded $1 are Marr v. Rife, 545 E2d 554 (6th Cir. 
1976), Fort v. White, 530 E2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1976), and Johnson v. Snyder, 470 E 
Supp. 972 (N.D. Ohio 1979). See also Warner v. Perrino, 585 E2d 171 (6th Cir. 1978) 
($1 verdict for plaintiff reversed for failure to satisfy statute of limitations) and Foun-
tila v. Carter, 571 E2d 487 (9th Cir. 1978) ($1 compensatory award accompanied by 
substantial punitive award). The largest award in a reported case is Parker v. Shon-
feld, 409 E Supp. 876 (N.D. Cal. 1976), where the jury awarded $20,000 ($10,000 in 
compensatory damages and $10,000 in punitive damages). For a list of all of the 
reported federal fair housing cases that have awarded compensatory damages, see 
Appendix A infra. See also Sutton v. Bloom, No. C 76-767 (N.D. Ohio 1978), 
reported in SchweIb, Outline of Law Relating to Discrimination in Housing, 1 EQUAL 
OPP. Hous. (P-R) '2353.1 (1979) ($63,100 award). 
The reader should be aware that three important cases involving compensatory 
damages for housing discrimination were decided too recently for inclusion in the 
analysis of this Article. See Miller v. Apartments and Homes of N.J., Inc., 646 E2d 
101 (3d Cir. 1981) ($11,252); Phiffer v. Proud Parrot Motor Hotel, Inc., 648 E2d 548 
(9th Cir. 1980) ($8,500); Phillips v. Butler, No. 80-C-3823 (N.D. Ill. July 22, 1981) 
($52,675). 
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plaintiffs in fair housing cases, noneconomic emotional harm or other 
forms of intangible injury. 
Rarely is the basis for the amount of the court's award satisfacto-
rily explained in the opinion. Moreover, the amount awarded often 
bears little relationship to any evidence of actual injury to a particular 
plaintiff in a given case. In one recent decision, for example, the court 
set its award not by reference to the facts of the case before it, but by 
noting the range of a number of other fair housing awards and award-
ing an amount somewhere in the middle.3 Of course, when the case is 
decided by a jury,4 the jury is not required to make findings or to 
explain its verdict. This uncertain situation has created a substantial 
problem for courts, for litigants, and for the proper enforcement of 
the federal fair housing laws, particularly as higher awards have been 
made in recent years.5 The problem of evaluating intangible injuries 
has also become important in other civil rights contexts,6 such as suits 
for employment discrimination7 and actions based on constitutional 
l Young v. Parkland Village, Inc., 460 E Supp. 67, 72 (0. Md. 1978)($1,000 in 
compensatory damages for emotional distress awarded because the court's "review of 
the pertinent authorities indicates that recent awards of compensatory damages for 
humiliation and m<!ntal anguish in cases of this sort have ranged from $192 to 
$2,500."). 
~In Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974), the Supreme Court held that a defen-
dant was entitled to a jury trial in a Title VIII suit seeking damages. 
5 See, e.g., Sutton v. Bloom, No. C 76-767 (N.D. Ohio 1978), reported in 
Schwelb, Outline oj Law Relating to Discrimination in Housing, 1 EQUAL OPP. 
Hous. (P-H)' 2353.1 (1979) ($63,100 award). 
6 See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 166 n.4 (1976) (action under 42 
U.S.C. § 1981 challenging exclusion of black children from private schools; Supreme 
Court upheld awards ranging from $500 to $2,000 to four of the plaintiffs for their 
"embarassment, humiliation and mental "anguish"); Wiggs v. Courshon, 355 E Supp. 
206 (S.D. Fla. 1973), appeal dismissed, 485 E2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1973)(diversity action 
based on state tort of "gross insult" to redress injury resulting from racial insults by 
restaurant waitress; trial judge allowed only $2,500 of jury's $25,000 award, which 
had consisted of $6,000 in compensatory and $19,000 in punitive damages). 
7 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-~34 (1976), 
authorizes reinstatement, back pay, liquidated damages, and other relief, but the 
courts have split over whether it permits damages for intangible injuries such as men-
tal anguish. Compare Vazquez v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 579 E2d 107 (1st Cir. 1978); 
Dean v. American Security Ins. Co., 559 E2d 1036, 1038-39 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. 
denied, 434 U.S. 1056 (1978) and Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 550 E2d 
834, 839-42 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (l978)(holding no such dam-
ages authorized) with Buchholz v. Symons Mfg. Co., 445 E Supp 706,713-14 (E.D. 
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violations by governmental officials.8 The solutions suggested in the 
fair housing field may well have an influence on the judicial response 
to damage claims in these other types of cases. 
This Article is an effort to address this problem and to determine 
if some systematic basis for evaluating compensatory awards in fair 
housing cases is possible. The legal basis for compensatory damage 
awards in housing discrimination cases is reviewed in Part I. That Part 
analyzes the provisions of federal fair housing laws and the construc-
Wis. 1978)(awarding $7,500 for "pain and suffering"); Coates v. National Cash Reg-
ister Co., 433 E Supp. 655, 663-65 (w.D. Va. 1977)(relying on advisory jury to award 
$15,000 for "pain and suffering" to each of two plaintiffs, who were also awarded 
substantial other damages and reinstatement); Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 
432 E Supp. 952 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Combes v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421 E Supp. 
841,847 (w.D. Okla. 1976)(awarding $500 for mental suffering and physical prob-
lems in addition to substantial liquidated damages and back pay). See generally Com-
ment, Relief Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 31 BAYLOR 
L. REv. 217 (1979); Comment, Age Discrimination: Monetary Damages Under the 
Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 58 NEB. L. REv. 214 (1979). 
A similar dispute over the availability of "pain and suffering" damages exists 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 
(1976), though most courts have held that such damages are not authorized. See, 
e.g., DeGrace v. Rumsfeld, 614 E2d 796, 808 (1st Cir. 1980); Harrington v. 
Vandalia-Butler Bd. of Educ., 585 E2d 192, 194-97 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 
U.S. 932 (1979); Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 368 E Supp. 829, 836-38 (N.D. 
Cal. 1973). But see Humphrey v. Southwestern Cement Co., 369 E Supp. 832, 835 
(w.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 488 E2d 691 (5th Cir. 1974)($1,200 
awarded for emotional distress). 
General compensatory damages are available in employment discrimination 
cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976), part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 
See, e.g., Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975); Garner 
v. Giarrusso, 571 E2d 1330, 1339 (5th Cir. 1978)(affirming $5,000 award for suffer-
ing and humiliation). 
8 Damage suits may be brought against state and local officials for violation of 
constitutional rights under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U .S.C. § 1983 (1976). See, 
e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980); Monell v. Department of 
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Federal officers may be sued for damages directly 
under the Constitution. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980)(eighth 
amendment); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979)(fifth amendment equal protec-
tion component); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Nar-
cotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)(fourth amendment). See generally Comment, New Dam-
age Remediesfor Violations of Constitutional Rights, 31 BAYLOR L. REv. 68 (1979); 
Note, "Damages or Nothing-The Efficacy of the Bivens-Type Remedy, 64 COR-
NELL L. REv. 667 (1979). 
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tion of those provisions by the courts, as well as the legal arguments 
for application of the doctrine of presumed damages to housing cases. 
Part II surveys those factors which appear to have some influence on 
the amount of damages awarded. Based on a review of forty-six fed-
eral housing discrimination cases,9 that Part examines the relationship 
between the size of the award and such factors as the type of housing 
involved, the family and employment status of the plaintiff, and the 
wealth of the defendant. This analysis does not lead to a set formula 
that can predict award amounts, but it does suggest some elements 
that should be considered in determining the size of a fair housing 
award, and it gives some sense of what the approximate value of a 
given case might be. 
I. The Laws Governing Compensatory Damages 
in Federal Fair Housing Cases 
A. Damages Authorized by the Federal Fair Housing Laws 
Racial disclimination in housing is prohibited by two federal 
laws: Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, [0 also known as the 
Fair Housing Act, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866. [[ The Fair Hous-
ing Act specificia11y authorizes a court to award, among other forms 
of relief, "actual damages and not more than $1,000 punitive dam-
ages."[2 The Act covers all types of housing, public and private, with 
9 See Appendix A infra. This analysis is based on reported decisions of the fed-
eral courts. Other significant sources of fair housing damage law exist, however, 
such as unreported decisions, settlements, and state cases involving the enforcement 
of both federal and state fair housing laws. Money settlements in federal cases have 
sometimes been substantial. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Hertz Homes, Inc., EQUAL OPP. 
Hous. (P-H) 118,026 (D.N.J. 1979) ($30,000); Dyer v. Schecter, EQUAL OPP. Hous. 
(P-H) 118,021 (N.D. Ohio 1978) ($41,000). 
10 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1976). Title VIII prohibits housing discrimination on 
the basis of color, religion, sex, and national origin, as well as race, see id. §§ 
3604-3606, and some of the cases discussed in this Article involve these other forms 
of discrimination. See, e.g., Morehead v. Lewis, 432 E Supp. 674 (N.D. Ill. 1971) 
(sex), United States v. Dittmar Co., 1 EQUAL OPP. Hous. (P-H) 113,730 (E.D. Va. 
1975) (national origin). Since most of the reported cases concern racial discrimina-
tion, however, that is the Article's primary focus, although the same principles would 
apply to other forms of housing discrimination as well. 
II 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982 (1976). 
u 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c). A housing discrimination complaint under Title VIII 
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limited exceptions. 3 The 1866 Civil Rights Act (section 1982) applies
to all types of property," but it is silent as to relief. Nevertheless, one
year after the Supreme Court held that the Civil Rights Act bars all
racial discrimination in the sale or rental of property,' the Court
decided in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.'6 that "compensatory
damages" are recoverable for a violation of section 1982 because
"[tihe existence of a statutory right implies the existence of all neces-
sary and appropriate remedies.'"
Courts have occasionally used Title VIII's $1,000 limit on puni-
tive damages as a guide for the award of punitive damages in section
1982 cases, although awards exceeding that amount are allowed under
that statute.' Thus, both compensatory (or actual) 9 damages and
punitive damages are available under both laws. The two statutes dif-
fer in the extent to which they allow recovery of court costs and attor-
ney's fees,2" and in the transactions that they cover.2'
may be brought either directly in court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 3612 or after an
initial administrative complaint to the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (HUD) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 3610. See generally Gladstone, Realtors v. Vil-
lage of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979). A court hearing a § 3610 claim may only pro-
vide injunctive and other equitable relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 3610(d); Brown v. Ballas,
331 E Supp. 1033, 1036 (N.D. Tex. 1971). Title VIII authorizes actual and punitive
damages only in a direct action under § 3612.
,1 42 U.S.C. § 3603 (1976). The Act does not apply to the sale or rental of
single-family dwellings by their owner, or the sale or rental of apartments in small
owner-occupied buildings. Id. § 3603(b).
" 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976). See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,413
(1968).
" Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968).
56 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
5, Id. at 239.
8 See, e.g., Dillon v. AFBIC Development Corp., 597 E2d 556, 563-564 (5th
Cir. 1979); Parker v. Shonfeld, 409 E Supp. 876 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Wright v. Kaine
Realty, 352 E Supp. 222 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
'9 Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 190 & n.1 (1974)("compensatory" and
"actual" used interchangeably).
20 Attorney's fees may be awarded under Title VIII only to prevailing plaintiffs
who are "not financially able to assume" them, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c)(1976), but this
financial restriction does not apply to fee awards in §1982 actions, which are gov-
erned by the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(1976). See, e.g., Dillon v. AFBIC Development Corp., 597 E2d 556 (5th Cir. 1979);
Hughes v. Repko, 578 E2d 483 (3d Cir. 1978).
11 Unlike Title VIII, 42 U.S.C. § 3604-3606 (1976), § 1982 does not prohibit dis-
1981]
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Finally, although claims for compensatory damages under Title
VIII and section 1982 can be brought in either state or federal court, 22
most cases based on the federal fair housing laws have been brought in
the latter forum. In any event, the court must apply federal law. As
the Sullivan opinion noted, "damages for deprivation of a federal
right are governed by federal standards" 23 Although both federal and
common law rules on damages may be used, depending which better
serves the policies expressed in the federal statutes, "[t]he rule on dam-
ages, whether drawn from federal or state sources, is a federal rule
responsive to the need whenever a federal right is impaired' 24
B. Federal Case Law
The Supreme Court has yet to review a damage award in a fair
housing case. The Court's three Title VIII decisions have dealt with
procedural issues, 25 and, apart from Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park,
Inc.,26 its modern section 1982 cases have been solely concerned with
crimination based on religion, sex, or national origin, see, e.g., Lee v. Minnock, 417
E Supp. 436, 439 (N.D. Pa. 1976), nor does it specifically ban discriminatory adver-
tising or financial arrangements. See Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 E2d
1032, 1036 n.9 (2d Cir. 1979) (§ 1982 protects only "citizens," while Title VIII pro-
tects "persons"). In some respects, however, § 1982 is broader than Title VIII, because
it is not subject to the exemptions that were written into Title VIII, see, e.g., Morris
v. Cizek, 503 E2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1974), and because it covers all real and personal
property, not just housing. See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229,
236-37 (1969).
22 Title VIII specifically provides for an action in state court, 42 U.S.C. §
3612(a)(1976). Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969) exemplifies
§ 1982 actions originating in state courts.
23 Id. at 239.
24 Id. at 240. Of course, state courts are free to apply their own damage stand-
ards to claims based on state or local fair housing laws.
25 Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979) (standing);
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974)(right to jury trial); Trafficante v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972)(standing).
26 396 U.S. 229 (1969). Sullivan held that damages could be awarded to a black
homeseeker and his would-be landlord in their § 1982 action against a community
organization that sought to block their transaction. The opinion neither describes
what types of damages were available nor how these damages should be measured.
Justice Harlan's dissent specifically criticized "the majority's failure to provide any
guidance as to the legal standards that should govern Sullivan's right to recovery on
remand." Id. at 252.
[Vol. 16
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defining the substantive scope of that statute.27 The closest the Court
has come to providing any guidance on this subject is the description
of the nature of a fair housing violation that appears in Curtis v.
Loether,28 a unanimous decision holding that a defendant was entitled
to a jury trial in a Title VIII case where damages were sought. Justice
Marshall's opinion stated that a damage action under Title VIII
"sounds basically in tort-the statute merely defines a new legal duty,
and authorizes the courts to compensate a plaintiff for the injury
caused by the defendant's wrongful breach! '29 The Court also sug-
gested that an action to redress racial discrimination in housing might
be likened to an action for defamation30 or some other dignitary tort.3
Professor Dobbs has defined dignitary torts as
injuries to the personality. This means that, though eco-
nomic or physical loss may be associated with the injury, the
primary or usual concern is not economic at all, but vindica-
tion of an intangible right.
... in a great many of these cases, the only harm is the
affront to the plaintiff's dignity, the damage to his
self-image, and the resulting mental distress.32
The Court apparently believes that a fair housing suit under sec-
tion 1982 would also be properly characterized as a tort action.33 The
27 Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973); Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490
(1975).
2- 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
29 Id. at 195. According to Curtis, the trial court's authority to compensate a
plaintiff for the injury caused by a Title VIII violation is not discretionary. "[I]f a
plaintiff proves unlawful discrimination and actual damages, he is entitled to judg-
ment for that amount!' Id. at 197.
10 Id. at 195 n.10.
11 Id., citing C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, CASES AND MATERALS ON TORTS 961
(2d ed. 1969).
32 D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 509-10 (1973).
31 Cf. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), in which the Supreme Court
held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibits private schools from denying admission to black
students because of their race. In resolving a statute of limitations issue, the Court
approved the application of the limitations period for personal injury actions, noting
1981]
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lesson seems to be that, whatever the statutory basis, a housing dis-
crimination claim sounds in tort34 and that compensation principles
applicable to tort law generally and to dignitary torts in particular
should govern damage awards in fair housing cases.3
There are difficult problems, however, in identifying what inju-
ries are caused by a fair housing violation and in determining an
appropriate monetary award for them. These questions have not been
addressed by the Supreme Court.
There are three elements to the injury resulting from a dignitary
tort: (1) economic loss; (2) emotional distress and other harm to the
plaintiff's personality; and (3) loss of rights. Each of these three ele-
ments has been judicially recognized as an appropriate basis for an
award of compensatory damages to a victim of housing discrimina-
tion. For example, in Steele v. Title Realty Company,36 the Tenth Cir-
cuit affirmed a $1,000 compensatory damage award in a Title VIII
case that included elements of economic loss and emotional distress.
Steele, a black university teacher, had been discriminated against in his
efforts to secure an apartment near his new job in Salt Lake City,
Utah. After suit was filed, Steele was permitted to inspect the apart-
ment, but he decided not to rent it. The district court then held a hear-
ing on damages and awarded him $13.25 in telephone expenses,
$125.00 in moving and storage expenses, and $861.75 for emotional
distress and humiliation.37 With respect to the economic losses, the
court of appeals noted that the telephone expense was stipulated and
that the moving and storage expenses were "necessitiated by the
that the plaintiffs claimed "damage to their persons" and that therefore the period
for "causes of action involving torts against persons" was appropriate. Id. at 182.
Sections 1981 and 1982 are normally construed in a similar manner, since both were
enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. See 427 U.S. at 170-74; id. at 190
(Stevens, J., concurring) (to give §1981 and §1982 a fundamentally different con-
struction "would be most incongruous").
14 A large number of lower courts have treated fair housing cases as tort
actions. See, e.g., Dillon v. AFBIC Development Corp., 597 E2d 556, 562 (5th Cir.
1979); Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n, 559 E2d 894, 901-02
(3d Cir. 1977); Wheatley Heights Neighborhood Coalition v. Jenna Resales Co., 447
F Supp. 838, 842 (E.D. N.Y. 1978).
" Cf. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 252-66 (1978) (tort principles govern dam-
age recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful school discipline).
31 478 E2d 380 (10th Cir. 1973).
11 Id. at 383.
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unavailability of the property in Salt Lake City" when Steele needed
it. 8 The court also affirmed the award for emotional distress,
although it was clear that the award, conveniently yielding a total
recovery of $1,000, was arbitrary: "Damages in cases of this kind are
not limited to out-of-pocket losses but may include an award for emo-
tional distress and humiliation." '39 Although the court noted that "it is
difficult to measure what amount is sufficient 'to ease one's feelings'
for injuries of this nature," it held that the district court's award of
$861.75 was not unreasonable.
40
Awards in a number of fair housing cases have been based solely
on the element of the plaintiff's emotional distress.4 Perhaps the most
influential of these decisions is Seaton v. Sky Realty Company,42 in
which a black couple, discriminated against in connection with their
31 Id. at 383-84. Examples of other reported fair housing cases that have
awarded compensatory damages for economic loss include Bunn v. Central Realty of
La., 592 E2d 891, 892 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) ($500 award primarily for
"inconvenience suffered in finding another apartment"); Crumble v. Blumthal, 549
E2d 462 (7th Cir. 1977) ($322); Jeanty v. McKey & Poague, Inc., 496 E2d 1119 (7th
Cir. 1974) ($100); Young v. Parkland Village, Inc., 460 E Supp. 67,71 (D. Md. 1978)
($88 in rent differential). See generally Lichtman, The Cost of Housing Discrimina-
tion: Assessment of Damages and Attorneys Fees for Violations of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 and the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 10 SurFoix U. L. REv. 963, 968-70
(1976). A number of cases have rejected the plaintiff's claim for economic losses, usu-
ally because the losses were not proved with sufficient clarity or because they were
not shown to have been caused by the defendant's discrimination. See, e.g., Mar v.
Rife, 503 E2d 735, 742-43 (6th Cir. 1974), aff'd after remand, 545 E2d 554 (6th Cir.
1976); Bradley v. John M. Brabham Agency, Inc., 463 F Supp. 27, 32 (D.S.C. 1978);
Lamb v. Sallee, 417 E Supp. 282, 286-87 (E.D. Ky. 1976).
19 478 E2d at 384. Examples of other fair housing cases that have awarded com-
pensatory damages for humiliation, embarrassment, or other forms of emotional dis-
tress are Bradley v. John M. Brabham Agency, Inc., 463 E Supp. 27,32 (D.S.C. 1978)
($2,000 for emotional distress); Young v. Parkland Village, Inc., 460 E Supp. 67,72
(D. Md. 1978) ($1,000 for emotional distress); Stevens v. Dobs, Inc., 373 E Supp.
618, 623 (E.D. N.C. 1974) ($1,500 primarily for mental anguish, humiliation, and
embarrassment).
40 478 E2d at 384.
" See, e.g., Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 E2d 634 (7th Cir. 1974)($500 for
embarrassment and humiliation); Wright v. Owen, 468 E Supp. 1115, 1118 (E.D.
Mo. 1979)($100 for distress and humiliation); Harrison v. Otto G. Heinzeroth Mort-
gage Co., 430 E Supp. 893, 897-98 (N.D. Ohio 1977)($5,000 for plaintiff "upset and
troubled" by a "very painful experience").
42 491 E2d 634 (7th Cir. 1974).
19811
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efforts to inspect a home in Chicago, was awarded $500 in compensa-
tory damages and $3,000 in punitive damages. In their appeal, the
defendants argued that the compensatory award was improper
because there had been no evidence of economic loss nor any medical
evidence of mental or emotional impairment. In rejecting this argu-
ment, the Seventh Circuit determined "that an award of compensa-
tory damages under § 1982 or 'actual damages' under § 3612 is appro-
priate for humiliation caused by the type of violations of rights
established here,""3 and that [h]umiliation can be inferred from the
circumstances as well as established by the testimony."" The court fur-
ther found that "$500 was well within the range of reasonable
amounts" in this case.45 In two subsequent fair housing decisions, the
Seventh Circuit relied on Seaton to hold that compensatory awards
which were limited to the plaintiffs economic losses or failed to
include an amount for the element of emotional distress were inade-
quate. 4
6
Loss of rights has also been recognized as an independent element
of damages in fair housing cases. In an early appellate decision, the
Seventh Circuit found that the defendants had discriminated against a
black apartment applicant and directed the district court to compen-
sate the plaintiff "for the loss of her civil rights and any mental
anguish suffered by her.' 7 Therefore, even when no mental anguish,
emotional distress, or economic loss is shown, damages may be
awarded simply for loss of rights. 8 For example, in Hodge v. Seiler,9
the district court refused to award Mrs. Hodge damages because she
had testified that she was not upset by the defendants' discrimination.
" Id. at 636.
1 Id. Accord Gore v. Turner, 563 E2d 159, 164 (5th Cir. 1977). Compare Fort
v. White, 530 E2d 1113, 1116 (2d Cir. 1976)(denial of compensatory damages for
humiliation affirmed where there was "no evidentiary basis which would allow the
trier of fact to estimate or assess such damages").
"1491 E2d at 638.
4 6 Crumble v. Blumthal, 549 F2d 462, 467 (7th Cir. 1977); Jeanty v. McKey &
Poague, Inc., 496 E2d 1119, 1121 (7th Cir. 1974). Accord, Gore v. Turner, 563 E2d
159, 164 (5th Cir. 1977); Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536 E2d 231, 236 (8th Cir.
1976).
47 Smith v. Scl D. Adler Realty Co., 436 E2d 344, 351 (7th Cir. 1971).
48 See, e.g., Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939)(upholding damage claim based
on deprivation of plaintiffs right to vote).
41 558 E2d 284 (5th Cir. 1977).
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The Fifth Circuit agreed that this testimony precluded an award for
emotional distress, but it held that the plaintiff was entitled to at least
nominal damages for her loss of rights, because "the deprivation of a
constitutional right carries with it damages distinct from those which
are embodied in the concept of humiliation and which deserve com-
pensation."
50
Damages for loss of rights are not always nominal." In Bradley
v. John M. Brabham Agency, Inc.,52 a black couple was awarded
$5,000 for loss of civil rights as well as $2,000 for emotional distress
for the discrimination they suffered in trying to inspect a house. The
$7,000 award of compensatory damages in Bradley, among the highest
compensatory awards to date in a fair housing case, was made even
though the plaintiffs failed to prove that they suffered any economic
loss as a result of the defendant's discrimination.
C. The Problem of Evaluating Intangible Injuries
The difficulty of assessing housing discrimination damages varies
with each of these three elements. The easiest element to calculate is
economic loss. Such losses are usually not significant; a typical case is
Steele v. Title Realty Company,"5 where economic losses caused by the
discrimination were limited to plaintiff's telephone calls, storage costs,
and other expenses related to finding other housing. These claims
rarely amount to more than a few hundred dollars. 4 Occasionally,
however, changes in interest rates or in the cost of housing can render
damages for economic loss significant.5 Moreover, the question of
10 Id. at 287.
S"mhe courts tend to presume some harm of more than nominal nature in the
dignitary tort cases!' D. DOBBS, supra note 32, at 531. But cf. Carey v. Piphus, 435
U.S. 247, 266-67 (1978) (in a § 1983 suit involving an award of damages for a depri-
vation of procedural due process, the Court held that the plaintiffs will be entitled to
recover nominal damages not to exceed one dollar").
-2 463 E Supp. 27 (D.S.C. 1978).
53478 F2d 380, 383 (10th Cir. 1973).
1" See cases cited in note 38 supra.
11 See, e.g., Moore v. Townsend, 577 E2d 424 (7th Cir. 1978) ($9,685.46 in
increased interest costs and lost tax benefits awarded under a supersedeas bond given
by defendants to stay the execution of a judgment of specific performance in favor of
plaintiffs).
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whether an expense incurred by the plaintiff was in fact caused by the
defendant's discrimination or is a proper subject for compensation at
all has often been hotly contested.
5 6
Calculating damages for emotional injury and loss of rights is
much more difficult. Evaluating the loss of rights element is particu-
larly complicated because the concept is not quantifiable and because
only a few decisions have actually included a separate award for this
injury. More cases have involved awards for emotional distress, but
they have not yielded any definitive guides for future awards. It is clear
that as a matter of law, both juries and trial judges have a great deal of
discretion in setting the amount of the compensatory damage award.57
Indeed, while a number of punitive damage awards in fair housing
cases have been set aside,58 no compensatory award has ever been
overturned. But to say that the factfinder has broad discretion in
determining the amount of the award does not identify the factors
which are or should be taken into account in exercising that discretion.
After more than a decade of fair housing litigation, this subject is still
little more than a guessing game.
D. The Case for Presumed Damages in Fair Housing Litigation
1. Carey v. Piphus
Carey v. Piphus" involved section 1983 suits by two students who
claimed that their fourteenth amendment rights to procedural due
" See, e.g., Hodge v. Seiler, 558 E2d 284, 287 (5th Cir. 1977); Steele v. Title
Realty Co., 478 E2d 380, 383-84 (10th Cir. 1973); Bradley v. John M. Brabham
Agency, Inc., 463 E Supp. 27, 32 (D.S.C. 1978).
11 See, e.g., Zarcone v. Perry, 572 E2d 52, 56 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1072 (1979)(dictum)(standard for setting aside a compensatory award on appeal
is "whether the award is so high as to shock the judicial conscience and constitute a
denial of justice"): Marr v. Rife, 545 E2d 544, 555 (6th Cir. 1976)($1 award affirmed
as "not clearly erroneous"); Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 E2d 634, 638 (7th Cir.
1974)($500 award affirmed as "well within the range of reasonable amounts"); Steele
v. Title Realty Co., 478 E2d 380, 384 (10th Cir. 1973)($1,000 award affirmed as "not
unreasonable"); Cf. Bills v. Hodges, 628 E2d 844, 846 (4th Cir. 1980) (trial court's
decision not to award compensatory damages "is largely a question of fact finding"
and will be upheld unless "clearly erroneous").
11 See, e.g., Foutila v. Carter, 571 E2d 487, 495 (9th Cir. 1978); Steele v. Title
Realty Co., 478 E2d 380, 385 (10th Cir. 1973).
59 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
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process were violated when they were suspended from their Chicago
public school without a hearing.60 The students sought declaratory and
injunctive relief and damages, and as a result of preliminary injunction
proceedings, each was readmitted to school within a few days of his
suspension. Holding that they had been denied procedural due proc-
ess, the trial court stated the students were entitled to declaratory relief
and to have the suspensions expunged from their school records, but
that no damages could be awarded because "[pllaintiffs put no evi-
dence in the record to quantify their damages and the record is com-
pletely devoid of any evidence which could even form the basis of a
speculative inference measuring the extent of their injuries"'61 The Sev-
enth Circuit reversed on the damages issue, holding that the students
could recover general damages "for the injury which is 'inherent in the
nature of the wrong' "caused by a denial of procedural due process.
62
The appeals court held general damages could be recovered without
proof of mental distress or any other individualized injury and ordered
that the damage award should be "neither so small as to
trivialize the right nor so large as to provide a windfall:' 63 In addition,
if the suspensions were not shown to be for a just cause, the students
would also be entitled to special damages, to be based on whatever
mental distress or other particularized injury they could show they suf-
fered as a result of their suspensions. 4
The Supreme Court reversed. Without dissent65 it rejected
the doctrine of presumed damages for plaintiffs who had been
60 One of the plaintiffs in Carey was suspended for 20 days for violating a rule
against smoking marijuana on school property, and the other was suspended for 20
days for violating a rule prohibiting male students from wearing earrings to class. 435
U.S. at 249-50.
61 Petition for Certiorari, Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978), at A-14
(reprinting district court's unreported decision).
62 545 E2d 30, 31 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd and remanded, 435 U.S. 247 (1978)
(quoting Hostrop v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515, 523 E2d 569 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 (1976)).
63 Id. at 32. In support of this proposition, the Seventh Circuit cited three deci-
sions, one of which was Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 E2d 634 (7th Cir. 1974), a fair
housing case in which the plaintiffs recovered $500 in compensatory damages with-
out a showing of financial injury. 545 E2d at 32 n.3.
64 545 E2d at 31-32 (citing Hostrop v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515,
523 E2d 569 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 (1976)).
65 435 U.S. 247 (1978). Justice Marshall concurred in the result, and Justice
Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Id. at 267.
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deprived of procedural due process;" plaintiffs could not recover
damages based simply on the "inherent ... nature of the wrong"
done to them. 7 According to Justice Powell's opinion, that wrong
might well cause mental and emotional distress, but "such injury can-
not be presumed to occur, and... plaintiffs at least should be put to
their proof on th[is] issue, as plaintiffs are in most tort actions. 68 In
addition to provable compensatory damages, the Carey Court left
open the possibility that punitive damages might be awarded "in a
proper case under § 1983" 69 and then held that nominal damages "not
to exceed one dollar" should be awarded, because the right to proce-
dural due process is "absolute" and "because of the importance to
organized society that procedural due process be observed'
7
1
According to Carey, whether tort law principles should fully con-
trol a section 1983 case depends upon the extent to which the interests
protected by the particular constitutional right involved parallel an
analogous branch of the common law of torts.71 If the parallel is a
close one, the tort rules may be applied directly to a section 1983
action. If, on the other hand, no body of tort law is sufficiently analo-
gous to adequately protect the constitutional interests involved in a
section 1983 case, the resolution of the damage issue "will be the more
difficult one of adapting common-law rules of damages to provide fair
compensation for injuries caused by the deprivation of a constitutional
right.""
7
Applying these principles to the procedural due process claims in
Carey, the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of presumed damages
was inappropriate. The Court noted that tort law did not generally
permit recovery of compensatory damages without evidence of actual
injury. The doctrine of presumed damages was applicable only to cer-
tain torts, like defamationper se, where serious injury to the plaintiff's
66 Id. at 260-263.
67 Id. at 260-61.
OS Id. at 262.
69 Id. at 257 n. 11. Punitive damages were not to be awarded to the plaintiffs in
Carey, however, because the trial court had found that the defendants had not acted
"with malicious intention to deprive [plaintiffs] of their rights or to do them other
injury... ." Id.
70 Id. at 266-67.
71 Id. at 258.
72 Id.
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reputation was "virtually certain" and the type of injury involved was
"extremely difficult to prove"' These two elements, the Court held,
were not present in procedural due process cases. Every departure
from procedural due process was not likely to cause mental or emo-
tional distress, and when distress did result, a plaintiff could be
expected to produce evidence of it with no particular difficulty. Thus,
the Supreme Court held that in procedural due process cases, "neither
the likelihood of such injury nor the difficulty of proving it is so great
as to justify awarding compensatory damages without proof that such
injury actually was caused "'74 The Court believed the issue of damages
in a procedural due process case could not be resolved by reference to
damages decisions in cases where different constitutional or statutory
rights were involved. The damage issue in a given case depends upon
"the nature of the interests protected by the particular constitutional
right in question!' 7 The Carey opinion made clear that "the elements
and prerequisites for recovery of damages appropriate to compensate
injuries caused by the deprivation of one constitutional right are not
necessarily appropriate to compensate injuries caused by the depriva-
tion of another.!76
2. The Carey Principles Applied to Fair Housing Cases
a. The Interests Protected by the Fair Housing Laws
At least four separate types of interests are protected by Title VIII
and section 1982. The first is the interest of the individual black home-
seeker in buying or renting the home of his choice limited only by the
financial means available to him. Essentially, this is the black consum-
er's interest in being able to obtain housing on the same terms as white
consumers. The best description of this interest is the Supreme Court's
71 Id. at 262.
74 Id. at 264.
71 Id. at 265.
16 Id. at 264-65. Commentators have generally refused to read Carey to fore-
close presumed damages for deprivations of anything but procedural due process
rights. See, e.g., Love, Damages: A Remedy for the Violation of Constitutional
Rights, 67 CA in. L. REv. 1242, 1266 (1979); Note, Damage Awards for Constitu-
tional Torts: A Reconsideration After Carey v. Piphus, 93 HARv. L. REv. 966,
971-74 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Damage Awards].
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opinion in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.," which noted that racial
discrimination makes people's "ability to buy property turn on the
color of their skin."' According to Jones, Congress responded to this
problem by enacting section 1982 "to assure that a dollar in the hands
of a Negro will purchase the same thing as a dollar in the hands of a
white man. "'
Of course, the right to buy or rent a home, free from racial dis-
crimination, carries with it the opportunity to find new employment,
to enroll one's children in different schools, and many other advan-
tages. Indeed, the Jones opinion specifically recognized that the free-
dom promised black persons by section 1982 was the "freedom to 'go
and come at pleasure' and to 'buy and sell when they please.' "o
Important as these additional opportunities are, however, they are all
derived from the consumer's basic interest in equal spending power
that Title VIII and section 1982 protect.8
The second interest is protection from the feeling of inferiority
-the "stigmatic" injury-resulting from racial discrimination.8 2 A
victim of housing discrimination not only is denied a particular house
or apartment, but he suffers that denial because of his race. This is the
type of injury the Court had in mind in Curtis v. Loether, when it
described a Title VIII action by a black plaintiff as a dignitary tort and
likened it to an action for defamation.
8 3
Two other groups of people also have interests that, while related
to the black homeseeker's interests, have been separately recognized as
77 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
11 Id. at 443.
79 Id.
10 Id. (footnotes omitted).
11 The black homeseeker's interest in equal spending power is shared directly by
his or her spouse, their children, and other family members (regardless of their race).
See, e.g., Pughsley v. 3750 Lake Shore Drive Coop. Bldg., 463 E2d 1055 (7th Cir.
1972)(suit by white couple allegedly denied housing because they had a black child
living with them); Lamb v. Sallee, 417 F Supp. 282 (E.D. Ky 1976)Xhousing suit by
unmarried interracial couple).
8' See generally Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 266-68 (1971)(White, J.,
dissenting); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954); Brest, Palmer v.
Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive,
1971 Sup. CT. REv. 95, 116 n. 110 (1971); Heyman, The Chief Justice, Racial Segre-
gation, and the Friendly Critics, 49 CALrF. L. REv. 104, 113-15 (1961).
83415 U.S. 189, 195 n.10 (1974).
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specially protected by the federal fair housing laws. One group is made
up of those housing suppliers who would sell or rent to black home-
seekers. An example of this group is the white lessor in Sullivan v. Lit-
tle Hunting Park, Inc., " who was held to have a cause of action under
section 1982 against third parties who tried to block the rental of his
home to a black.85 The interest of these housing suppliers is access to a
discrimination-free market for the sale or rental of their properties."
Residents of a community whose racial composition has been
kept segregated as a result of the defendant's discrimination hold the
fourth interest. In both Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood87
and Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.," the Supreme
Court upheld Title VIII claims by white and black residents who
alleged that the defendant's racial discrimination against others pre-
vented their neighborhood (Gladstone) or apartment complex (Traffi-
cante) from being racially integrated. The Trafficante opinion noted
that congressional supporters of Title VIII sought by its passage to fos-
ter "integrated and balanced living patterns" and that the intended
beneficiaries of this goal were the residents of the entire commdnity
and not merely the direct targets of racial discrimination. 9 In the
Gladstone and Trafficante cases, the plaintiffs' loss of the "benefits
from interracial associations"90 might include both financial damage
"396 U.S. 229 (1969).
"Other examples are Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 436 E2d 344 (7th Cir.
1971) and Williamson v. Hampton Management Co., 339 E Supp. 1146 (N.D. Ill.
1972).
"6 See Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109-11 (1979);
Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 437 (1973). Housing
suppliers may also have non-financial interests in making housing available to minor-
ities. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 262-63 (1977).
87 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
8' 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
89409 U.S. at 211 (quoting 114 CONG. REc. 3422 (1968)(remarks of Sen. Mon-
dale)). The view that a major goal of Title VIII was "integrated and balanced living
patterns" and not just increased opportunities for minority homeseekers has been
widely accepted by the courts. See, e.g., Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.
v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 E2d 1283, 1289, 1294 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); Otero v. Nev York City Housing Auth., 484 E2d 1122,
1134 (2d Cir. 1973). See generally Schwemm, Discriminatory Effect and the Fair
Housing Act, 54 NoTRE DAME LAW. 199, 210 (1978).
90 Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 112; Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 210.
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(e.g., lower property values and missed business opportunities)91 and
intangible injuries (e.g., embarrassment and lost social benefits).92
While no reported decision has yet put a dollar value on these injuries,
Gladstone and Trafficante make clear that they are compensable under
Title VIII.13
Lower courts have recognized that various fair housing claims
may involve more than one type of interest and may be likened to dif-
ferent kinds of common law actions. For example, in Meyers v. Pen-
nypack Woods Home Ownership Association,94 the Third Circuit con-
sidered a section 1982 claim brought by a black who was denied the
right to contract for the purchase of a home in the defendant's subdivi-
sion. The court compared the nature of the plaintiff's section 1982
claim to such state causes of action as a personal injury, breach of con-
tract, trespass and wrongful appropriation of property, defamation
and intentional infliction of mental distress, invasion of privacy, and
other unspecified torts.9 Although the court eventually focused on the
black homeseeker's contractual rather than dignitary interest,9 6 the
importance of the opinion lies in its general approach, which accepted
the need to analyze each type of fair housing claim individually in
order to determine what interests are involved. Indeed, after Carey v.
Piphus,97 the issue of whether damages may be presumed to flow from
a fair housing violation must be resolved on the basis of which of the
four interests protected by Title VIII and section 1982 are at stake in a
given case.
91 Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 110-11; Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 208.
9, Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 111-12; Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 208.
9' There is still some question whether such injuries are compensable under
§ 1982. Compare Broadmore Improvement Ass'n v. Stan Weber & Assocs., 597 E2d
568 (5th Cir. 1979) and Sherman Park Community Ass'n v. Wauwatosa Realty, 486 E
Supp. 838 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (upholding Gladstone-type claims under both Title VIII
and § 1982) with Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 128-29
(1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (claim in Gladstone would not be actionable under
§ 1982). See generally Schwemm, Standing to Sue in Fair Housing Cases, 41 Omo
ST. L.J. 1, 49-51, 69-71 (1980).
94 559 E2d 894 (3d Cir. 1977).
11 Id. at 900-03. Such a comparison was necessary to determine the appropriate
statute of limitations.
6 Id. at 902.
9 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
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b. The Carey Requirements for Presumed Damages Applied to the
Four Fair Housing Interests
The strongest case for presumed damages in housing discrimina-
tion litigation would be based on the second of the four fair housing
interests-the black homeseeker's interest in being protected from the
stigma of racial discrimination. This is the interest that was involved
when the Supreme Court described a fair housing action as a "digni-
tary tort" and likened it to an action for defamation.9" This descrip-
tion is extremely significant to a discussion of presumed damages after
Carey v. Piphus because the Court in that case recognized that pre-
sumed damages are appropriate in some forms of defamation cases. 99
The two conditions in Carey for the doctrine of presumed dam-
ages in defamation per se cases-that serious, intangible injuries are
very likely to result from such a tort and that these injuries are difficult
to prove'--are present in housing discrimination cases. The decisions
to date show that most plaintiffs who are the direct objects of housing
discrimination suffer some degree of emotional distress, at least when
the defendant's discrimination is intentional. Moreover, the wide range
of awards for this type of injury shows that serious difficulties do exist
in proving it. A plaintiff who merely testifies that he was distressed by
the defendant's treatment of him may well receive a higher award than
a plaintiff who produces expert and other corroborative testimony of
his emotional distress. 101 In addition, although the Supreme Court
views it as treating the damage issue as a question of fact,'0 2 the now
widely accepted technique of inferring an award for intangible injuries
from the circumstances of a fair housing case'0 3 is essentially based on
the presumption that plaintiff's response to discrimination will be that
of a "reasonable person" (i.e., that he will suffer intangible damages).
91 Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 n.10 (1974).
99 435 U.S. at 262 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974)).
100 Id.
"o Compare Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 E2d 634 (7th Cir. 1974)($500 com-
pensatory award based solely on plaintiff's testimony and the circumstances of the
case) with Marn v. Rife, 503 E2d 735 (6th Cir. 1974), aff'd after remand, 545 E2d 554
(6th Cir. 1976)($1 award in case where vife was hospitalized as a result of severe emo-
tional distress allegedly caused by defendant's discrimination).
'o2 Carey, 435 U.S. at 264 n.22 (1978).
See, e.g., Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 E2d 634, 636 (7th Cir. 1974).
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It is a logical extension to use this inference to presume damages when-
ever a black homeseeker is victimized by intentional discrimination.
On the other hand, the Carey principles seem to prevent an award
for presumed damages for the first, third, and fourth interests pro-
tected by the fair housing laws. For example, the third interest-the
home supplier's interest in a discrimination-free housing market-is
primarily economic, although other considerations may occasionally
be involved.' 4 Because most violations of this interest will not cause
distress or other intangible injury, the doctrine of presumed damages
enunciated in Carey indicates that aggrieved housing suppliers "should
be put to their proof on the issue" of damages. 10
The black homeseeker's interest in equal spending power is also
primarily economic.0 6 Other, less tangible interests may be dependent
on this economic interest, such as the opportunity to secure a better
job or to live in a different neighborhood, but in many cases, injuries
to these interests would also be susceptible to proof. Furthermore, to
the extent that the plaintiff's emotional distress results from being pre-
vented from living in the particular apartment or house he desires, the
Supreme Court has hinted that this type of injury should be consid-
ered a question of fact subject to proof.L 0 7 Thus, the basic nature of
this first interest and its "provability" suggest that presumed damages
may not be available for its violation.
The fourth interest-the interest of residents in integration in
their community-is comprised of both economic and intangible ele-
ments. With respect to the economic claims of lower property values,
lost business opportunities, and the like, Carey would seem to require
that the plaintiffs be put to their proof. The question of presumed
damages is more difficult, however, when the difficulty of proving the
less tangible, social injuries of living in an illegally segregated commu-
nity is considered. With respect to the difficulty-of-proof issue, the
,04 See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263 (1977)(in which the Corporation's interest resulted "not
from a desire for economic gain, but rather from an interest in making suitable
low-cost housing available in areas where such housing is scarce").
101 Carey, 435 U.S. at 262.
,01 Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n, 559 E2d 894,
899-903 (3rd Cir. 1977).
10 Carey, 435 U.S. at 264 n.22. See Love, supra note 76, at 1266.
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Court has stated that the presence of these injuries "should be ascer-
tainable on the basis of discrete facts presented at trial""08 This com-
ment, however, was addressed primarily to proof concerning the
causal link between the defendant's discrimination and the plaintiff's
injuries and not so much to proof about the nature of those injuries.
Moreover, Carey's second justification for presumed damages-the
likelihood of intangible injuries occurring in a given case-may also
exist in a loss-of interracial-associations claim. °-
c. The Enforcement Interest and Presumed Damages
In holding that Title VIII protected the plaintiffs' interests in
Trafficante, the Supreme Court pointed out that "complaints by pri-
vate persons are the primary method of obtaining compliance with the
Act," and thus for "vindicating a policy that Congress considered to
be of the highest priority."'I The congressional decision to give private
plaintiffs the primary responsibility for enforcing Title VIII means
that their claims not only vindicate their own interests, but also deter
discriminatory activities.
Similarly, damages in dignitary tort actions serve the dual func-
tions of compensation and deterrence. Because presumed damages are
recognized as a legitimate device for vindicating those two interests in
dignitary tort cases' 1" and because of the Court's prior recognition of
the similarity between those torts and housing discrimination claims, " 1
2
this dual enforcement scheme of vindication and deterrence is another
reason to apply presumed damages to housing suits.
Title VIII's authorization of punitive damages and attorney's
fees" 3 does not undercut this argument. Title VIII specifically limits an
award of punitive damages to $1,000. An award of attorney's fees is
available only to plaintiffs of limited means, and if its availability pro-
vides incentives to initiate litigation, the incentive is not for the victim
"I Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 114 (1979). See
'Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972)(indicating that
proof of the plaintiffs' injury would be required at trial).
109 See Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 208-10.
-0 Id. at 209, 211.
" See Love, supra note 76, at 1260-61.
11 Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 n. 10 (1974).
42 U.S.C. § 3612(c)(1976).
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of housing discrimination, but for his lawyer."' Furthermore, that
these limitations on punitive damages and attorney's fees do not exist
in section 1982 suits has not resulted in more vigorous private enforce-
ment of fair housing requirements under section 1982 than under Title
VIII.
Indeed, the overall record of enforcement under both federal fair
housing laws has been extremely disappointing. Individual cases have
been won, but "if anything, housing segregation and discrimination
has become more pervasive and more intractable" in the years since
Title VIII was enacted. ' 5 By now, it is generally recognized that the
inadequate enforcement mechanisms of the fair housing laws are the
primary cause of their failure to achieve integration goals." 6 Enforce-
ment by private suits has failed because damage awards are generally
too low to justify the cost of bringing suit."17 As one prominent fair
housing advocate described the situation to Congress, blatant housing
discrimination "still exists and the only way it is stopped is through
damage awards, making housing bias too expensive to practice!" 8
The part of the Carey v. Piphus opinion ' 9 that indicates that an
award of nominal damages should not exceed $1 has made the eco-
nomic obstacles to private enforcement even higher. Prior to Carey,
some lower courts had indicated that amounts greater than $1 might
I" See Note, Damage Awards, supra note 76 at 983. See also Hearings on H.R.
3504 and H.R. 7787 Before the Subcomm. on Civil Constitutional Rights of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978)(hereinafter cited as 1978
Hearings), at 5 (statement of Patricia Harris, Secretary of HUD):
Many complainants do not have the necessary funds to initiate litigation,
even with the prospect of having attorney's fees awarded should the com-
plainant's position prevail. Thus, as a practical matter, many complainants
are unable to utilize their right to seek a remedy through the courts, and
therefore, must rely solely on the administrative process.
Is Hearings, supra note 114, at 2 (remarks of Cong. Edwards). See Note,
Benign Steering and Benign Quotas: The Validity of Race-Conscious Government
Policies to Promote Residential Integration, 93 H. v. L. Ruv. 938, 938-39 (1980).
'6 See, e.g., 1978 Hearings, supra note 114, at 5 (testimony of HUD Secretary
Harris) ("The most significant deterrent to litigation remains its high cost").
"1 1978 Hearings, supra note 114, at 5 (testimony of HUD Secretary Harris)
("The most significant deterrent to litigation remains its high cost').
,,1 978 Hearings, supra note 114, at 147 (testimony of Avery S. Friedman).
139 Carey, 435 U.S. at 267.
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be awarded as "nominal damages" for fair housing violations. 2  This
technique of awarding high nominal damages to increase compensa-
tory awards in the absence of proven economic losses or emotional
distress will presumably be no longer available after Carey.
In summary, congressional reliance on private suits as the pri-
mary enforcement mechanism of the fair housing statutes means that
damage awards must be substantial enough to serve the functions of
deterrence and vindication as well as compensation. This is a signifi-
cant difference between fair housing cases and procedural due process
cases like Carey, where compensation is the only objective of a damage
award. The enforcement objectives of damage awards in fair housing
cases provide an additional reason in support of presumed damages in
such cases.
II. An Analysis of Compensatory Damage Awards
Because the cases give little explicit guidance on the factors that
have influenced the size of awards, it is necessary to analyze the rela-
tionship between the results reached and certain case variables. To do
this, I have listed all of the reported federal fair housing cases that
have awarded compensatory damages in Appendix A.' The cases are
listed in descending order according to the amount of their compensa-
tory awards.'22 For each case, the Appendix shows the amount of the
compensatory award, whether punitive damages were also awarded,
whether the award was made by a judge or jury, and certain other fac-
120 See, e.g., Hodge v. Seiler, 558 E2d 284, 288 (5th Cir. 1977); Bradley v. John
M. Brabham Agency, Inc., 463 E Supp. 27, 32 (D.S.C. 1978) ($5,000 award for loss
of civil rights).
121 The method used to identify all of the reported federal fair housing cases was
to check for references to Title VIII and to § 1982 in the "Statutes Construed" section
of each volume of the Federal Reporter, Second Series and the Federal Supplement
from 1968 to the present and to read all of the cases reported in the Prentice-Hall
Equal Opportunity in Housing service. Of the cases thus identified, only those in
which the plaintiff was awarded compensatory damages were selected for the chart.
Decisions for the defendant, decisions for the plaintiff that resulted in only equitable
relief or punitive damages, and decisions on pre-trial procedural issues were not
included.
22 Cases in which multiple plaintiffs were awarded individual damages are listed
according to the amount of the total award in the case.
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tors that might be significant. Forty-six awards are listed, and they
may be categorized as follows:
Summary Table 1
Number of Awards Amount of Award
12 Over $1,500
6 $1,500
3 Between $1,000 and $1,500
3 $1,000
3 Between $500 and $1,000
5 $500
14 Under $500
Source: Appendix A infra.
A. Jury Trials
Whether the trier of fact is a judge or a jury appears to affect the
size of the award. Juries have awarded most of the large and most of
the small awards. Though ten jury trial awards have thus far been
reported, only one has resulted in a compensatory award in the range
of $100-$1,300, an area in which some 22 judge decisions have been
reported.
The explanation for this relationship is not readily apparent. The
low jury awards might have been compromise verdicts, in which a
number of the jurors initially believed that the defendant's liability had
not been established; juries are probably less able than judges to sepa-
rate the liability and relief phases of the case in their decisions. Cer-
tainly, the suggestion that the strength of the plaintiff's case on the lia-
bility issue may influence the size of the damage award is worth
considering.' 3 Additionally, the racial prejudice of jurors cannot be
I" See, e.g., Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 E2d 634, 636 (7th Cir. 1974)
("Humiliation can be inferred from the circumstances" in a fair housing case).
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overlooked as a possible factor.'24 Still, compromise and prejudice
alone do not supply a complete explanation for the low jury awards.
In Fountila v. Carter,'25 for example, the jury's $1 compensatory
award was accompanied by a $5,000 punitive damage award, indi-
cating its belief that the defendant's discrimination was deliberate and
had been clearly shown.'26
That juries have been responsible for most of the high fair hous-
ing awards is somewhat surprising. In the early years of housing dis-
crimination litigation, plaintiffs' lawyers, afraid of jury prejudice,
often fought against jury trials.'27 Because jury verdicts for defendants
are not generally reported, it cannot be said with certainty that these
fears have proved to be entirely without substance, but it is clear that
at least some juries are capable of more generous awards in fair hous-
ing cases than are judges. 128
124 In Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 198 (1974), the Court noted "the possibil-
ity that jury prejudice may deprive a victim of discrimination of the verdict to which
he or she is entitled!'
.25 571 E2d 487 (9th Cir. 1978).
,26 The Fountila jury's award of $5,000 in punitive damages was held excessive
on appeal, although the Ninth Circuit did conclude that some award of punitive dam-
ages was warranted because the evidence showed that the defendant "discriminated
in conscious and deliberate disregard of the plaintiffs' rights." 571 E2d at 492.
,27 See cases cited in Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 191 n.2 (1974).
128 [A] strong argument can be made that substantial damages are more
likely to be awarded in a particular fair housing case by a jury than a judge.
Despite the historic and generally legitimate mistrust of juries in civil rights
cases, experience indicates that when the facts are clear and the violation is
particularly egregious, a jury may be more inclined to express its outrage
through a large money award than would a court (see, e.g., Wiggs v.
Courshon, 355 E Supp. 206 (S.D. Fla. 1973)). A judge may require more
particular proof of actual financial damages and may fear he is establish-
ing a precedent if he makes a substantial award, whereas a jury, which has
only one chance to exercise power as the moral voice of the community,
may react more emotionally and may include in a compensatory award
what amounts to a fine or penalty, even if all of the elements technically
required for punitive damages are not present.
LEADERsHiP COUNCIL FOR METROPOLITAN OPEN COMiUlImTs, Jury Trials in Fair
Housing Cases 4-5 (1975). Juries also seem capable of higher awards than judges in
other civil rights contexts. See, e.g., Dellums v. Powell, 566 E2d 167 (D.C. Cir.
1977)jury verdict of $7,500 for each plaintiff who was falsely arrested in demonstra-
tion reversed as excessive under the circumstances); Rogers v. Exxon Research and
Eng'r Co., 404 E Supp. 324 (D. N.J. 1975), rev'd, 550 E2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
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B. Punitive Damages and the Defendant's Intent
While it is possible for a defendant to violate the federal fair
housing laws without engaging in intentional discrimination,' 29 the
reported damage cases listed in Appendix A have generally been based
on the allegation that the defendant actually intended to discriminate
against the plaintiff. The nature of the defendant's behavior and his
motivation are indeed relevant considerations in determining the size
of a compensatory damage award in the dignitary tort field, since
these factors "will affect the plaintiff's sense of outrage and dis-
tress."'
Nevertheless, because so many of the highest compensatory
awards in fair housing cases have been made by juries who do not
explain their decision, it is often difficult to tell whether the defen-
dant's discrimination was considered outrageous or even intentional by
the factfinder. In many of these cases, the most that can be gleaned
from the case report is whether the judge or jury thought that the
defendant's discrimination was sufficiently deliberate to justify an
award of punitive damages. The standard for awarding punitive dam-
ages in fair housing cases has been stated in various ways by the
courts, but at a minimum, proof must show that the defendant's dis-
crimination was intentional and that he knew or should have known
that his conduct was illegal, so that he might be said to have acted "in
conscious and deliberate disregard of the plaintiff's rights!"'3
denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1977)(ury verdict of $750,000 for pain and suffering in age
discrimination case remitted to $200,000 by trial court; then held unauthorized by
appellate court).
That judges are not incapable of awarding substantial compensatory damages is
demonstrated quite clearly by the three recent cases referred to in note 2 supra, all of
which involved trials before a judge.
,29 A number of courts of appeals have held that a showing of discriminatory
effect is sufficient to establish a violation of Title VIII. See, e.g., Robinson v. 12
Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 E2d 1032, 1036-1038 (2d Cir. 1979); see generally Schwemm,
supra note 89.
110 D. DOBBS, supra note 32, at 530.
"I Fountilav. Carter, 571 E2d 487,492 (9th Cir. 1978). But see Adickes v. S. H.
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 233 (1970)(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part)(award of punitive damages in § 1983 case appropriate if it is shown that the
defendant acted "with actual knowledge that he was violating a right ... or that the
defendant acted with reckless disregard of whether he was thus violating such a
right.").
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Summary Table 2
Punitive Damages
Size of Award Yes No
Over $1,500 10 2
$1,500 5 1
Between $1,000 and $1,500 2 1
$1,000 1 2
Between $500 and $1,000 2 1
$500 3 2
Under $500 5 8
Source: Appendix A infra.
As Summary Table 2 shows, punitive awards were made in ten of
the twelve highest compensatory damage cases but in only five of the
thirteen lowest award cases. Thus, although a punitive award does not
guarantee a high compensatory award, its absence is correlated with
low compensatory awards.
C. Other Aspects of the Defendant's Behavior
Often a defendant who has been found to have intentionally dis-
criminated against a minority plaintiff has engaged in some form of
duplicity that tends to aggravate his offense. Indeed, if he has dealt
with the plaintiff personally, it is almost certain that the defendant has
either (1) told the plaintiff to his face that the plaintiff was being dis-
criminated against, or (2) lied to the plaintiff about the reason that the
desired housing was not available.
Most of the reported fair housing decisions in which compensa-
tory damages of $500 or more have been awarded have called specific
attention to such behavior by the defendant. For example, in Allen v.
Gifford,'32 where the court awarded $3,500 compensatory damages
and $5,000 punitive damages against a subdivision developer, the
defendant told the plaintiffs that he would not sell them a homesite
because he felt that his investment would be ruined if a black family
132 368 E Supp. 317 (E.D. Va. 1973).
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moved into his development."' In other cases the defendant
announced his racially discriminatory policy to "testers" or other third
parties likely to report the defendant's remarks to the plaintiff." ' On
the other hand, a substantial compensatory award may also result if
the defendant tries to hide his discriminatory policy by lying to the
plaintiffs about his real reason for rejecting them, as was done in
Seaton v. Sky Realty Company, Inc.'3 In some cases, such as Todd v.
Lutz, "6 in which $1,500 was awarded in compensation, both of these
elements were present.
In addition to examining the defendant's behavior at the time of
the discrimination, a number of fair housing decisions have scrutinized
the defendant's conduct after the discrimination had occurred. Two
related questions have seemed to interest the factfinder in such cases:
1) whether the defendant took any steps to rectify the situation, such
as offering the desired housing to the plaintiff once the discrimination
had been discovered, and 2) whether the defendant continued to main-
tain his original position, which sometimes included lying at trial about
his reasons for refusing to deal with the plaintiff. For example, the
corporate defendant in Marr v. Rife'37 was assessed only $1 in com-
pensatory damages in a suit involving an "isolated" act of one of its
employees that was "promptly rectified" by the company's offer of the
33 Id. at 320. Other high compensatory award cases in which the defendant told
the plaintiffs directly that their race was the reason he would not deal with them
include: Bradley v. John M. Brabham Agency, Inc., 463 E Supp. 27, 29-30 (D. S.C.
1978); Young v. Parkland Village, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 67, 71 (D. Md. 1978); Bishop v.
Pecsok, 431 F Supp. 34, 36 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Lamb v. Sallee, 417 E Supp. 282, 286
(E.D. Ky. 1976).
" In the typical case, "testers" are white individuals who pose as prospective
home buyers or renters in order to determine if a potnetial defendant would sell or
rent to a white, even though the defendant has refused to deal with a
similarly-situated black applicant. See, e.g., Northside Realty Assocs. v. United
States, 605 E2d 1348, 1354-55 (5th Cir. 1979); Grant v. Smith, 574 E2d 252, 254 n.3
(5th Cir. 1978).
1" 491 E2d 634, 636 (7th Cir. 1974). Other cases in which the defendant lied to
the plaintiffs about his real reason for rejecting them include Knight v. Auciello, 453
F2d 852 (1st Cir. 1972) and McNeil v. P-N & S, Inc., 372 E Supp. 658, 659 (N.D. Ga.
1973).
136 1 EQUAL Opp. Hous. (P-H) 13,787 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
M 545 E2d 554 (6th Cir. 1976).
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desired housing to the plaintiff five days after it discovered the inci-
dent.'38 No punitive damages were awarded against the company, and
the trial judge's nominal compensatory award was affirmed by the
Sixth Circuit.' 39
In general, therefore, it appears that the defendant's duplicity, his
communication of a discriminatory policy to the plaintiff or others,
and his intransigence following the incident and even during trial are
not only relevant to whether punitive damages will be awarded in a fair
housing case, but are also likely to affect the size of the compensatory
award. Of course, evidence of these facts also means that the plaintiff
probably has a strong case on the issue of liability. It may be that the
principal conclusion to be drawn from this section is simply that a con-
nection generally exists between the strength of the plaintiff's evidence
on liability and the size of the compensatory award he receives. If, as
the Seventh Circuit has held, "[h]umiliation can be inferred from the
circumstances as well as established by the testimony,"'40 then strong
evidence of an intentionally discriminatory policy aggravated by publi-
cizing that policy or by lying about it to the plaintiff and the court
seems likely to encourage a judge or jury to believe that the plaintiff
has indeed suffered substantial emotional distress as a result of the
defendant's behavior.
D. The Defendants Size and Corporate Status
As a matter of law, the amount of punitive damages awarded
may well depend on the defendant's size or net worth,"' but this factor
is not generally considered relevant to a determination of the plaintiff's
"I Id. at 556. See also Fountila v. Carter, 571 E2d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 1978) ($1
compensatory award for "single, isolated incident"). But see Buxton v. Patel, 595
E2d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1979) ("isolated" incident of discrimination produces jury
award of $7,500 compensatory damages and $7,500 punitive damages).
3 545 E2d 554 (6th Cir. 1976).
140 Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 E2d 634, 636 (7th Cir. 1974). Accord, Gore v.
Turner, 563 E2d 159, 164 (5th Cir. 1977).
4 See, e.g., Fountila v. Carter, 571 E2d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 1978); Parker v.
Shonfeld, 409 E Supp. 876, 881 (N.D. Cal. 1976). See also D. DOBBS, supra note 32,
at 218.
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actual injuries.4 2 However, a victim of housing discrimination might
well suffer greater loss, both economically and emotionally, if he is
rejected by a large apartment complex or subdivision rather than an
individual offering only a single unit. More of the housing market is
closed off to a plaintiff when a relatively large defendant discriminates
against him, and the rejection by a major firm inay be more painful
because it is perceived as reflecting the opinion of a more important
and powerful segment of society. In addition, it seems likely that a
large corporate defendant might be assessed a higher compensatory
award than an individual simply because of the factfinder's reaction to





Between $1,000 and $1,500
$1,000
Between $500 and $1,000
$500
Under $500
Source: Appendix A infra.
Wealthy or Corporate Defendant







Nine of the reported cases do not contain information concerning the
defendant's corporate status or size.
1,1 See, e.g., D. DoBBs, supra note 32, at 218 ("The existence or non-existence of
the defendant's wealth or financial support is wholly irrelevant when it comes to com-
pensatory damages:'); see generally note 32 supra.
I' In addition to judging a defendant's conduct in awarding damages, the
trier of fact may also be concerned with his standing in the community and
especially the size of his firm. A large real estate management firm will
almost surely be subject to much higher damages for discrimination than
[Vol. 16
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As Summary Table 3 suggests, there is some correlation between
size of defendant and size of the compensatory award. Of the top
twelve awards (those above $1,500), three were made in jury trials in
which the defendant's size cannot be ascertained, but the other nine
were all made against defendants whose wealth, corporate status, or
number of units controlled indicated "deep pockets."
Conversely, the defendants in many of the low award cases were
individuals who were renting or selling only one or two units that they
personally owned. The $1 award in Fort v. White"' against defen-
dants who controlled some 1,500 apartments and in Marr v. Rife'
4
1
against a real estate agency are exceptions to this rule, but it is worth
noting that in neither of these cases were punitive damages assessed
against the corporate defendant. Perhaps more significant as a qualifi-
cation on the "large defendant-large award" rule is the fact that no less
than eight of the middle range award cases (from $500 to $1,500)
involved very modest defendants. Thus, it is possible to win a respect-
able compensatory award against a small defendant, but the highest
awards are likely to come only against sizable defendants.
E. Evidence of the Plaintiff's Emotional Distress
Most compensatory awards in fair housing cases are primarily
based on the element of the plaintiff's emotional distress.' 6 In all of
the nonjury cases awarding $1,000 or more in compensatory damages,
the court has either specifically found that the plaintiff suffered humil-
iation, embarrassment, or some other form of emotional distress
will a "little old lady" who discriminates in renting a unit in her only build-
ing, even if the same type of prohibited behavior is involved.
LEADERSHIP COUNCIL FOR METROPOLiTAN OPEN CoMMuNIms, GUIDE TO PRACnCE
OPEN HousING LAW 16 (1974). Compare Parker v. Shonfeld, 409 E Supp. 876 (N.D.
Cal. 1976)($10,000 in compensatory damages awarded against defendants with net
worth of $500,000) with Warner v. Perrino, 585 E2d 171 (6th Cir. 1978)(reversing on
other grounds the district court's unreported award of $1 and attorney's fees against a
72 year old woman with only one house to rent).
'"530 E2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1976).
503 E2d 735 (6th Cir. 1974), aff'd after remand, 545 E2d 554 (6th Cir. 1976).
1,6 See, e.g., cases listed in note 39 supra.
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caused by the defendant's discrimination," 7 or implied such a finding
by making an award for the plaintiffs emotional distress.'" It also
seems probable that this type of evidence was adduced in the jury trials
that resulted in large compensatory awards.'
49
Evaluating the effect of this factor on the size of compensatory
awards is not an easy matter. First of all, many of the low award cases
also involved claims by the plaintiff of emotional distress. Second,
many of the very high and very low awards have resulted from jury
trials, and although it is generally impossible to know the nature of the
plaintiff's evidence, it does seem likely that the plaintiff would claim
emotional distress in both low award and high award cases. Third, the
plaintiff's emotional distress can be shown in a variety of ways. Emo-
tional distress can be inferred from the circumstances or established by
the testimony,' 0 though a common form of proof is simply the plain-
tiff's testimony that he was humiliated, embarrassed, troubled, or
otherwise distressed by what the defendant did to him. '
"I Bradley v. John M. Brabham Agency, 463 E Supp. 27, 32 (D.S.C. 1978);
Young v. Parkland Village, Inc., 460 E Supp. 67, 72 (D. Md. 1978); Harrison v. Otto
G. Heinzeroth Mortgage Co., 430 E Supp. 893, 897 (N.D. Ohio 1977); Todd v. Lutz,
2 EQUAL Opp. Hous. (P-H) 13,787 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Adams v. Hempstead Heath
Co., 2 EQUAL Opp. Hous. (P-H) 13,781 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Clemons v. Runck, 402
E Supp. 863, 868 (S.D. Ohio 1975); United States v. Dittmar Co., I EQUAL Opp.
Hous. (P-H) 13,370 (E.D. Va. 1975); Hughes v. Dyer, 378 E Supp. 1305, 1310
(W.D. Mo. 1974); Stevens v. Dobs, 373 F Supp. 618, 623 (E.D.N.C. 1974); Branch v.
Deaver, I EQUAL Opp. Hous. (P-H) 13,689 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Mason v. Ward, 1
EQUAL Opp. Hous. (P-H) 13,688 (S.D. Ohio 1974); McNeil v. P-N & S, Inc., 372 E
Supp. 658, 659 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Allen v. Gifford, 368 E Supp. 317, 322 (E.D. Va.
1973); Franklin v. Agostinelli, 1 EQUAL Opp. Hous. (P-H) 13,555 (W.D. Wash.
1971).
'" Steele v. Title Realty Co., 478 E2d 380 (10th Cir. 1973); Bishop v. Pecsok,
431 E Supp. 34, 38 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Lamb v. Sallee, 417 E Supp. 282, 287 (E.D.
Ky. 1976); Marshall v. Pendley, 1 EQUAL Opp. Hous. (P-H) 13,615 (N.D. Ga.
1973).
'"9 See, e.g., Parker v. Shonfeld, 409 F Supp. 876, 879 (N.D. Cal. 1976);
Clemons v. Runck, 402 F Supp. 863, 867 (S.D. Ohio 1975).
"I See, e.g., Bradley v. John M. Brabham Agency, Inc., 463 E Supp. 27, 32
(D.S.C. 1978); Harrison v. Otto G. Heinzeroth Mortgage Co., 430 E Supp. 893, 897
(N.D. Ohio 1977); Hughes v. Dyer, 378 F Supp. 1305, 1310 (W.D. Mo. 1974);
McNeil v. P-N & S, Inc., 372 E Supp. 658, 659 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
"I See, e.g., Crumble v. Blumthal, 549 E2d 462, 467 (7th Cir. 1977); Seaton v.
Sky Realty Co., 491 E2d 634, 636 (7th Cir. 1974); Steele v. Title Realty Co., 478 E2d
380, 384 (10th Cir. 1973); Young v. Parkland Village, Inc., 460 E Supp. 67, 72 (D.
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On occasion the plaintiff will claim that his emotional distress has
manifested itself in weakened relationships with, for example, his
spouse, his friends, or his employer.'52 Claimg of physical ailments
resulting from emotional distress are rare, but the ones made in Allen
v. Gifford '5 and Marr v. Rife5" are worth noting because of the dif-
ferent judicial responses they produced. In both cases, the plaintiffs
were a married couple, and the wives claimed to have been hospital-
ized as a result of severe emotional distress caused by the defendants'
discrimination.' The court in Allen v. Gifford accepted this testi-
mony and awarded $3,500 in compensatory damages, one of the high-
est awards by a judge to date, while the court in Marr v. Rife found
the plaintiffs claim "speculative and unconvincing" and awarded only
$1 in compensatory damages.'
Emotional distress resulting from discrimination may damage
personal relationships.' 57 Rarely, however, have fair housing plaintiffs
produced witnesses, such as friends, co-workers or employers, to cor-
roborate their own testimony of emotional distress.'58 Perhaps no cor-
roboration is required when a husband whose efforts to secure hous-
ing for his family were illegally blocked testifies that he was humiliated
"as a man" and stripped of his rights "as a father to my kids!" 59 While
the quality of the plaintiff's testimony on this point is important, its
acceptance by the judge or jury has thus far depended less on its par-
Md. 1978); Bishop v. Pecsok, 431 E Supp. 34, 36 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Lamb v. Sallee,
417 E Supp. 282, 287 (E.D. Ky. 1976); Allen v. Gifford, 368 E Supp. 317, 322 (E.D.
Va. 1973).
"I Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 E2d 634, 636 (7th Cir. 1974) (plaintiff humi-
liated as a father and a man); Young v. Parkland Village, Inc., 460 E Supp 67, 72 (D.
Md. 1978) (co-workers testify that plaintiff was shocked and upset); McNeil v. P-N &
S, Inc., 372 E Supp. 658 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (strain on plaintiffs' marriage).
368 E Supp. 317 (E.D. Va. 1973).
, 503 E2d 735 (6th Cir. 1974), aff'd after remand, 545 E2d 554 (6th Cir. 1976).
155 Allen, 368 E Supp. at 321; Mar, 503 E2d at 742.
"16 Allen, 368 E Supp. at 322; Mar, 554 E2d at 555.
'" For expert testimony on the damaging effects of housing discrimination on
an individual's mental condition and personal relationships, see LEADERsHIP COuN-
CIL FOR METROPOLITAN OPEN CoMMuNITnIs, EXPERT WITNESSES IN FAmR HousING
CASES 9-41 (1975). See also Lithtman, supra note 38, at 970 n.41.
"' But see Young v. Parkland Village, Inc., 460 E Supp. 67, 72 (D. Md. 1978)
(co-workers testify that plaintiff was shocked and upset).
,19 Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 E2d 634, 636 (7th Cir. 1974.
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ticularity or corroboration than on such intangible and varying factors
as whether the plaintiff is believable, likeable, or vulnerable to stress'60
and whether the factfinder is receptive to this type of claim.'
6'
? The Plaintiff's Family and Employment Status
The plaintiff's marital status and the nature of his work may in
theory affect the injury he suffers. A married couple with children
whose search for a home is illegally frustrated simply has more per-
sonal relationships that are subject to disruption than a single plaintiff.
Additionally, a person with a particularly important or lucrative job
might be more harmed in his work by the added stress of housing dis-
crimination than a plaintiff with a less demanding position.
For example, in Allen v. Gifford,' 2 where the plaintiff had both
a family and a high level job, compensatory damages of $3,500 were
awarded. The plaintiffs were a married couple with two children who
had moved from Miami, Florida, to Norfolk, Virginia, so that Dr.
Allen could accept a position as Assistant Superintendent of Schools in
Norfolk. The court found that his job made Dr. Allen particularly
interested in living in an area with white families, such as the housing
development constructed by the defendant. Indeed, the plaintiffs did
eventually secure a home in the defendant's subdivision some 110 days
after they were initially rejected. During this time, they lived in a
motel, and Mrs. Allen became ill and was hospitalized. Although the
judge did not include the amount of the motel bill in his damage
award, his substantial award for the plaintiffs' emotional distress per-
haps reflected consideration of the added pressures that a family
would feel as a result of extended motel living and a major job change.
"' See, e.g., Steele v. Title Realty Co., 478 E2d 380, 384 (10th Cir. 1973) (pre-
vious discrimination relevant in setting amount of compensatory award for emo-
tional distress).
t' See, e.g., Jeanty v. McKey & Loague, Inc., 496 E2d 1119, 1121 (7th Cir.
1974) (court remanded issue of compensatory damages because trial court failed to
consider emotional distress, and in questioning failure to award punitive damages,
court stated that trial court erred in considering plaintiffs personality rather than
defendant's motive and attitude).
I'l 368 E Supp. 317 (E.D. Va. 1973).
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Summary Table 4
Size of Award Plaintiff's Family Status
Couple Single Family
Over $1,500 4 6 2
$1,500 3 2 1
Between $1,500 and $1,000 2 1 0
$1,000 2 0 1
Between $1,000iand $500 1 0 2
$500 1 3 1
Under $500 3 9 2
Source: Appendix A infra.
163
As Summary Table 4 indicates, it is hard to demonstrate the
influence of family status on the size of compensatory awards. Six of
the top twelve compensatory award cases involved single plaintiffs.
Indeed, there are some striking examples of low awards to family
plaintiffs, such as the $1 awards to the couples in Marr v. Rife164 and
Fountila v. Carter.
1 65
The significance of the nature of the plaintiff's job is also unclear.
Few plaintiffs in the reported fair housing decisions had positions as
public as Dr. Allen's, and in only two other cases did the court specifi-
cally find that the defendant's discrimination had an adverse effect on
the plaintiffs professional standing.1 6s Still, many of the plaintiffs who
received awards of $750 or greater have been teachers, university stu-
dents, or career military personnel. 67 These higher awards to middle-
63 The plaintiffs in Case 5 are treated as a couple. Those in Cases 8 and 33 are
treated as families. Those in Cases 18 and 20 are treated as singles.
.61 545 E2d 554 (6th Cir. 1976).
165 571 E2d 487 (9th Cir. 1978).
166 United States v. Dittmar Co., 1 EQUAL O'p. Hous. (P-H) 13,730, at 14,628
(E.D. Va. 1975); McNeil v. P-N & S, Inc., 372 E Supp. 658, 659 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
367 See, e.g., Steele v. Title Realty Co., 478 E2d 380, 383 (10th Cir. 1973) (uni-
versity teacher); Bradley v. John M. Brabham Agency, Inc., 463 E Supp. 27, 28 (D.
S.C. 1978) (Air Force sergeant); Bishop v. Pecsok, 431 E Supp. 34, 35-36 (N.D.
Ohio 1976) (university students); Lamb v. Sallee, 417 E Supp. 282, 284 (E.D. Ky.
1976) (students); Clemons v. Runck, 402 E Supp. 863, 870 (S.D. Ohio 1975) (high
school teachers); Stevens v. Dobs, Inc., 373 E Supp. 618, 620 (E.D.N.C. 1974)
(university employee-graduate student).
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and upper-class blacks may reflect greater factfinder sympathy for
those plaintiffs. The higher awards may also reflect a greater degree of
emotional distress. When blacks attain a certain economic status, their
expectations naturally rise. When confronted with housing discrimina-
tion, they face the stark reality that they cannot spend their money
everywhere a white person can. Disappointment, resentment, humilia-
tion, and anxiety understandably result.
G. The Type of Housing Involved
The degree of emotional distress suffered by a minority home-
seeker might be affected by whether he was trying to buy a house
when he was discriminated against or was merely looking for an apart-
ment. In general, a house purchase suggests a greater financial and
emotional commitment than a rental situation. Indeed, buying a home
in the United States-whether it is a "dream house" or a starter
bungalow-is usually one of the major decisions in a person's life. It
may also coincide with the family and employment factors discussed in
the previous section, since buying a house is often prompted by a




Size of Award Rental Sale
Over $1,500 7 4
$1,500 4 2
Between $1,000 and $1,500 3 0
$1,000 2 1
Between $500 and $1,000 3 0
$500 4 1
Under $500 10 3
Totals 33 11
Source: Appendix A infra.68
"' Cases 11 and 43 do not disclose the type of transaction involved.
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Summary Table 5 indicates that a fair housing award may be
higher in sale cases than in rental cases. Even though three-fourths of
the reported decisions for which such information is available involved
rentals (either for an apartment or a house), more than one-third of
the compensatory awards of $1,500 or over were made in house-sale
cases. Conversely, in awards of less than $1,000, rental cases pre-
dominated, accounting for seventeen of the bottom twenty-one
awards. Although Summary Table 5 exhibits some exceptions, it does
appear than discrimination in house purchases tends to result in higher
awards than discrimination in apartment rentals.
H. The Date of Decision
Fair housing has been the law in the United States since 1968,169
and reported decisions awarding compensatory damages have
appeared since 1971. It is reasonable to expect that increased familiar-
ity with' 0 and acceptance of'7 ' these suits by judges and juries would
lead to increased awards in the more recent housing discrimination
cases.
Greater acceptance of the law also means that judges and juries
might view a particular type of discriminatory conduct as more outra-
geous now than if it had taken place ten years ago, and they might also
feel that a victim of housing discrimination would be more shocked
and distressed by it today. More recent cases might involve higher
awards than earlier ones simply because of inflation in the intervening
decade.
169 See note 1 supra.
,,I See, e.g., Fort v. White, 530 E2d 1113, 1116 (2d Cir. 1976) (plaintiff's lawyer
erroneously believed that damages for emotional distress are punitive in nature);
Crumble v. Blumthal, 549 E2d 462, 467 (7th Cir. 1977) (trial judge erroneously lim-
ited plaintiff's compensatory damages to his economic losses); Jeanty v. McKey &
Poague, Inc., 496 E2d 1119, 1121 (7th Cir. 1974) (same).
I71 Public acceptance of fair housing may be greater in some parts of the country
than in others. For example, a number of the higher compensatory damage awards
have been made in cases arising in California. See, e.g., Buxton v. Patel, 595 E2d
1182 (9th Cir. 1979); Samuel v. Benedict, 573 E2d 580 (9th Cir. 1978); Parker v.
Shonfeld, 409-E Supp. 876 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Branch v. Deaver, 1 EQuAL OPs'. Hous.
(P-H) 13,689 (N.D. Cal. 1974). But see Fountila v. Carter, 571 E2d 487 (9th Cir.
1978).
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The decided cases, however, do not seem to reflect any strong
correlation between a later date of decision and a higher award.
Although the five highest awards were made during or after 1976,
there are three 1973 cases among the top twelve awards, and almost
half of the awards of $1,000 or more were made in the first half of the
1970s. In addition, a number of recent cases have resulted in very low
awards, including three decisions in 1978 and 1979 that awarded $1.
One possible explanation for the absence of a strong relationship
between dates of decisions and large awards is that the typical defen-
dant's conduct may be less egregious or more difficult to detect over
time. Thus, it may be that the same fact situation would indeed result
in a higher compensatory award today than in the early 1970's, but
that housing discrimination has become more subtle in recent years.
L The Personality of the Parties and the
Skills of the Lawyers
Experienced trial lawyers know the difficulty of predicting the
amount of an award for something as elusive as emotional distress.
Some factors, such as the wealth of the defendant, that may affect the
outcome can be identified in advance, but more intangible factors will
often influence the judge or jury. Two specific intangibles-the par-
ties' personalities and the lawyers' skills-have been specifically
referred to in some fair housing cases in ways that suggest that they
influenced the amount of the verdict.' 72 Nevertheless these factors are
,72 For example, in Jeanty v. McKey & Poague, Inc., 496 E2d 1119 (7th Cir.
1974), the trial judge awarded only $100 in compensatory damages and no punitive
damages. Apparently his refusal to award any punitive damages was based on his
negative reaction to the plaintiff's personality at trial. Id. at 1121. The Seventh Cir-
cuit reversed, holding that this consideration was not relevant to the issue of punitive
damages, but the case strongly suggests that the trial court's low compensatory award
may also have resulted in part from its personal dislike of the plaintiff. Id.
With respect to the lawyers' skills, a verdict in any litigation might reflect how
well the case was presented. TWo of the lower award decisions include at least implied
criticisms of the plaintiffs' lawyers. In Fort v. White, 530 E2d 1113, 1116 (2d Cir.
1976), the Second Circuit upheld a $1 award where the plaintiffs' attorneys did not
press the claim for compensatory damages at trial, apparently because they mis-
takenly believed that damages for humiliation and embarrassment were punitive and
not compensatory in nature. Similarly, the trial court in Morehead v. Lewis, 432 E
Supp. 674, 677 (N.D. Ill. 1977),where the conpensatory award was only $150 for each
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inherently unquantifiable, and their significance will vary from case to
case.
Conclusion
For over a decade, federal judges and juries have struggled with
the difficult problem of evaluating the largely intangible injuries to vic-
tims of housing discrimination. Their decisions present a wide range of
responses to this problem, and when viewed as a whole, they appear
arbitrary and provide little guidance for future cases. Nevertheless, the
reported cases reveal that factfinders are particularly sensitive to the
degree of intent underlying the defendant's discrimination and the size
of the defendant's business. Additionally, cases of discrimination
involving purchases generally result in higher compensatory awards
than cases involving rentals. Belief by the judge or jury that the plain-
tiff has actually suffered emotional distress is also significant. As in all
litigation, certain intangibles, such as the personalities of the parties,
the relative skills of the lawyers, and the factfinder's predisposition,
influence the size of the compensatory award. Jury awards are usually
high or low; judges make awards somewhere in the middle.
In light of the enforcement structure of Title VIII and section
1982, it is distressing that fair housing awards have generally been so
small, particularly when compared with awards in related fields.' 73
Only a handful of the reported fair housing awards have exceeded a
few thousand dollars. The few sizable awards and the correspondingly
inadequate level of private enforcement have meant that Title VIII has
plaintiff, commented that the plaintiffs' lawyers were inexperienced and that their
complaint was "sketchily drafted and barely [met] the minimum standards of liter-
acy' But see Jeanty, 496 E2d at 1121 (plaintiff's counsel described as "highly quali-
fied" in case in which trial judge awarded only $100 in compensatory damages). Con-
versely, tactical mistakes by the defendant's lawyer may result in higher compensatory
awards in fair housing cases, see Friedman, Damages in Housing Bias Litigation, 21
N.Y.L.E 551, 555-56 (1976).
It has also been suggested that plaintiffs recovery may be enhanced by the repu-
tation of his lawyer, especially if the case is settled before trial. AssOCIATION OF TRIAL
LAWYERS OF AMERICA, ANATOMY OF A PERSONAL INmRY LAW Sorr 214 (1978).
173 Compare cases cited in notes 6-8 supra. Dean Bell has observed that compen-
satory damage awards in fair housing cases "present a marked contrast with damages
recovered in other emotional distress cases!' (D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERI-
CAN LAW 517 n.4 (2d ed. 1980).
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generally failed to achieve its goal of replacing ghettos with truly inte-
grated and balanced living patterns.
One response to the problem of inadequate enforcement is to
apply the doctrine of presumed damages in fair housing cases. The
Supreme Court's rejection of this doctrine in procedural due process
cases in Carey v. Piphus expressly left open the possibility that pre-
sumed damages might be appropriate in other constitutional and civil
rights cases. An analysis of the interests protected by the federal fair
housing laws in light of the Carey principles suggests that presumed
damages should be awarded for certain injuries under Title VIII and
section 1982.
Even if the doctrine of presumed damages were accepted as part
of fair housing law, however, the problem of deciding how much to
award for such damages would remain. Perhaps the best solution
would be for Congress to establish a fixed minimum compensatory
recovery of $1,000 for victims of housing discrimination, as it has
done in other fields. 7 4 In the absence of legislative guidance, the
courts will no doubt be reluctant to set an arbitrary floor for recov-
ery.'" At the very least, however, courts that have heretofore consid-
ered Title VIIIs $1,000 limit on punitive damages to be a "target" fig-
ure should adjust their sights upward.
As long as the amount of a compensatory damage award is left to
the unstructured discretion of the trial judge or jury, substantial varia-
tions in fair housing awards are likely to continue. While the overall
level of compensatory awards should grow in the future, the relative
size of these awards will probably still be influenced by the factors
identified in this Article.
'14 See, e.g., The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. §§
2510-2520 (1976 & Supp. VII 1979), which provides for liquidated damages of $1,000
or $100 a day for each violation, whichever is greater, id. at § 2520(2)(a); The Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (Supp. III 1979) which
includes a similar $1,000-or-$100-per-day provision. See § 1810.
" Judicial reluctance to establish a minimum recovery may stem in part from
the fear that such judge-made determinations might be inconsistent with the defen-
dant's constitutional right to a jury trial in these cases. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S.
189 (1974); see also Damage Awards, supra note 76, at 990.
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